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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge 
 
On June 24, 1996, Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge 
signed into law the Act of June 24, 1996, P.L. 350, No. 57 
("Act 57"), which substantially reformed Pennsylvania's 
system of workers' compensation. On December 4, 1996, 
the plaintiffs, three unincorporated labor organizations -- 
the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, Local 3, AFL-CIO; 
Local 22 of the International Association of Firefighters, 
AFL-CIO; and District Council 47 of the American 
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, 
AFL-CIO (collectively "plaintiffs") -- filed this action against 
the Governor; Johnny J. Butler, Secretary of Labor and 
Industry; and Richard A. Himler, Director of the Bureau of 
Workers' Compensation, in their official capacities, seeking 
a declaration that Sections 204(a) and 306(a.2) of the 
Pennsylvania Worker's Compensation Act, Act of June 2, 
1915, P.L. 736 ("WCA"), as amended by Act 57, violate the 
United States and Pennsylvania constitutions. The plaintiffs 
also sought an injunction permanently enjoining the 
defendants from enforcing these sections. They rely upon 
42 U.S.C. S 1983. 
 
The defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 
and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). With regard to their Rule 
12(b)(1) motion, the defendants argued that the district 
court lacked jurisdiction because: (1) the matter is not ripe 
for judicial review; (2) plaintiffs lack standing to pursue 
their claims; and (3) plaintiffs' claims are barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. The 
district court granted the Motion to Dismiss, basing its 
holding on the conclusion that plaintiffs' claims were not 
ripe and, therefore, did not present a justiciable 
controversy. The court rejected defendants' argument that 
plaintiffs' complaint is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, 
and declined to address whether plaintiffs had standing or 
whether they had stated proper claims for relief. 
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Plaintiffs filed a timely appeal, contending that the 
district court erred in holding that their claims were not 
ripe. Defendants cross-appealed, seeking review of the 
district court's refusal to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint based 
upon the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and exercise plenary 
review over the district court's order dismissing plaintiffs' 
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 
Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. Adams, 961 F.2d 405, 410 
(3d Cir. 1992). We affirm on the ground that the dispute is 
not justiciable because plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate 
a controversy ripe for resolution by the federal courts. We 
therefore decline to reach the issues raised by the cross- 
appeal. 
 
I. THE CHALLENGED PROVISIONS 
 
A. The Impairment Rating (Procedural Due Process Claim) 
 
Section 4 of Act 57 amended Section 306 of the WCA to 
add section 306(a.2), 77 P.S. S 511.2 (West Supp. 1997), 
permitting employers to require an employee to submit to 
an impairment rating evaluation after the employee receives 
total disability benefits for 104 weeks. See 77 P.S. 
S 511.2(1). Pursuant to section 511.2, an impairment rating 
evaluation is performed by a licensed physician chosen by 
the parties or appointed by the Department of Labor and 
Industry (the "Department"). See id. The purpose of the 
evaluation is to determine the level of the employee's 
impairment rating. If the employee's impairment rating is 
fifty percent or greater under the American Medical 
Association's Guide to the Evaluation of Permanent 
Impairment, he or she remains classified as "totally 
disabled." See S 511.2(2). If, however, the examination 
results in an impairment rating that is less thanfifty 
percent, the employee is reclassified as "partially disabled." 
See id. 
 
The change in status from "totally disabled" to "partially 
disabled" does not automatically affect the amount of 
compensation that the insurer must pay the employee. 
Rather, the Act provides that "[u]nless otherwise 
adjudicated or agreed to based upon a determination of 
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earning power under [S 512(2)], the amount of 
compensation shall not be affected as a result of the change 
in disability status and shall remain the same." See 
S 511.2(3). The change in status does, however, affect the 
length of time that a claimant may receive workers' 
compensation benefits. An employee who is classified as 
"totally disabled" is entitled to collect benefits for as long as 
he or she remains classified as such. An employee with a 
partial disability, however, is eligible to receive benefits only 
for a period of 500 weeks, or approximately ten years. See 
S 511.2(7). 
 
Before changing an employee's disability status, an 
employer must provide the employee with sixty days notice 
that his or her impairment rating evaluation showed that 
the employee was less than fifty percent impaired. See 
S 511.2(2). The Act also provides that "[a]n employee may 
appeal the change to partial disability at any time during 
the five hundred-week period of disability; Provided, That 
there is a determination that the employee meets the 
threshold impairment rating that is equal to or greater than 
fifty percentum impairment . . .." S 511.2(4). 
 
Plaintiffs seek a declaration that, on its face, WCA 
S 306(a.2), 77 P.S. S 511.2, violates the due process clauses 
of the United States and Pennsylvania constitutions, U.S. 
Const. amend. XIV; Pa. Const., art. 1, S 1. Although the Act 
provides employees whose status is changed to partially 
disabled the right to appeal their change in status, see 77 
P.S. S 511.2(4), plaintiffs maintain that the procedures that 
will ultimately be employed by the Department during this 
"appeal process" will deprive their members of the right to 
procedural due process of law. Plaintiffs rest this claim on 
the fact that the term "appeal" is not defined in the statute 
and that, typically, an appeal to the Worker's 
Compensation Board, as opposed to a hearing, does not 
involve a fact-finding procedure and de novo adjudication. 
Plaintiffs further allege that the Act is rendered facially 
unconstitutional by the fact that the appeal process 
contained in S 511.2(4) is only available following a 
determination that the employee is equal to or greater than 
fifty percent impaired. 77 P.S. S 511.2(4). Plaintiffs also 
seek to enjoin enforcement of the statute. 
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B. The Pension Offset (Contracts Clause Claim) 
 
Section 3 of Act 57 amended Section 204(a) of the WCA 
to provide that benefits from a pension plan -- to the extent 
funded by the employer directly liable for the payment of 
wage replacement compensation received by a claimant-- 
shall be credited against the amount of the award to the 
claimant for wage replacement benefits based on injury or 
occupational disease.1 See 77 P.S. S 71(a) (West Supp. 
1997). The plaintiffs contend that the offset for pension 
benefits violates the contracts clause of both the United 
States and Pennsylvania constitutions, U.S. Const. art. I, 
S 10, cl. 1; Pa. Const. art I, S 17, by unilaterally diminishing 
the contractual pension rights of public sector employees 
by reducing the value of their pension benefits. Again, 
plaintiffs seek declaratory relief and an injunction. 
 
II. RIPENESS 
 
"The existence of a case and controversy is a prerequisite 
to all federal actions, including those for declaratory or 
injunctive relief." Presbytery of New Jersey of Orthodox 
Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454, 1462 (3d Cir. 
1994). One aspect of justiciability is ripeness which 
"determines when a proper party may bring an action."2 
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Obusek, 72 F.3d 1148, 1154 (3d Cir. 
1995) (quoting Armstrong, 961 F.2d at 411). The function of 
the ripeness doctrine is to prevent federal courts,"through 
avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling 
themselves in abstract disagreements." Abbott Labs v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Prior to the enactment of section 3 of Act 57, the Act allowed 
employers to offset the amount of workers' compensation benefits 
payable by the amount of unemployment compensation benefits paid to 
the claimant. See 77 P.S. S 71 (West 1992). Act 57 continues to allow 
employers to offset workers' compensation benefits by unemployment 
benefits, but it also permits employers to offset Social Security 
benefits, 
severance benefits, and pension benefits. See 77 P.S. S 71(a) (West Supp. 
1997). 
 
2. As noted above, the district court declined to address defendants' 
challenge to plaintiffs' standing. We too will not address this question, 
and assume for the purposes of this discussion that plaintiffs have 
standing. 
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Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967), overruled on other 
grounds, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977).3 
Further, "[w]e presume that federal courts lack jurisdiction 
unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the record." 
Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 316 (1991) (internal 
quotations marks and citations omitted). It is the plaintiffs' 
responsibility to clearly allege facts that invoke the court's 
jurisdiction. See id. 
 
In Abbott Labs, the Supreme Court established a two- 
part test for determining whether a prayer for a declaratory 
judgment is ripe. A court should look to (1) "thefitness of 
the issues for judicial decision," and (2) "the hardship to 
the parties of withholding court consideration." 387 U.S. at 
149; Texas v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1257, 1260 (Mar. 
31, 1998).4 Under the "fitness for review" inquiry, a court 
considers whether the issues presented are purely legal, as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In this respect, the ripeness doctrine is closely related to the case 
or 
controversy requirement of Article III of the United States Constitution. 
See United States ex rel. Ricketts v. Lightcap, 567 F.2d 1226, 1231 & n.6 
(3d Cir. 1977). Just how closely related, however, is not entirely clear. 
As 
we have previously noted: 
 
       There is some disagreement among courts and commentators as to 
       whether the ripeness doctrine is grounded in the case or 
controversy 
       requirement or is better characterized as a prudential limitation 
on 
       federal jurisdiction. . . . But regardless whether the ripeness 
       doctrine has a prudential component, it seems clear that it is at 
       least partially grounded in the case or controversy requirement. 
 
See Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. Adams, 961 F.2d 405, 411 n.12 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). 
 
Thus, while we believe that an argument can be made that plaintiffs' 
claims do not present the type of case or controversy to which federal 
courts are limited, we need not pursue this inquiry separately, since it 
is subsumed within our ripeness analysis. 
 
4. In Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 912 F.2d 643 (3d 
Cir. 1990), we offered a three-part inquiry as a refinement of the 
Supreme Court's test. Our inquiry focuses on: (1) the adversity of the 
parties' interests; (2) the conclusiveness of the judgment; and (3) the 
utility of the judgment. 912 F.2d at 647. Our refinement simply alters 
the headings under which various factors are grouped, and since Step- 
Saver, we have employed both tests. Compare Artway v. Attorney General 
of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1247 (3d Cir. 1996) (two-part test), and New 
Hanover Tp. v. United States, 992 F.2d 470, 472 (3d Cir. 1993) (same) 
with Armstrong, 961 F.2d at 41 (three-part test), and Travelers Ins., 72 
F.3d at 1154 (same). We apply the Supreme Court's two-part test 
because we find that its framework better accommodates our analysis in 
this case. 
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opposed to factual, and the degree to which the challenged 
action is final. The various factors that enter into a court's 
assessment of fitness include: whether the claim involves 
uncertain and contingent events that may not occur as 
anticipated or at all; the extent to which a claim is bound 
up in the facts; and whether the parties to the action are 
sufficiently adverse. See Riva v. Massachusetts, 61 F.3d 
1003, 1009-10 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 
The second prong focuses on the hardship that may be 
entailed in denying judicial review, and the determination 
whether any such hardship is cognizable turns on whether 
the challenged action creates a "direct and immediate" 
dilemma for the parties, such that the lack of pre- 
enforcement review will put the plaintiffs to costly choices. 
See Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 152; W.R. Grace & Co. v. EPA, 
959 F.2d 360, 364 (1st Cir. 1992). 
 
A. The Impairment Rating (Procedural Due Proce ss Claim) 
 
Plaintiffs allege that WCA S 304(a.2) is unconstitutional 
because it does not, on its face, afford their members a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard regarding the change in 
their disability status from "totally" to "partially" disabled. 
Since this change in status will lead directly to the 
termination of benefits after a 500 week period, plaintiffs 
allege that, by action of the statute, their members will be 
deprived of their property (i.e. the compensation benefits) 
without due process of law.5 The district court concluded 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. As noted above, this assertion rests on plaintiffs' interpretation of 
the 
appeal process provided in section 304(a.2)(4), 77 P.S. S 512.2(4), which 
they contend does not provide for a de novo hearing reviewing the 
change in disability status. Plaintiffs' interpretation is undermined by 
the 
regulations promulgated by the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and 
Industry interpreting Act 57 which became effective on January 17, 
1998, after the district court had issued its order. The section of the 
regulations which implements the appeal provision of section 306(a.2), 
provides that: 
 
       At any time during the receipt of 500 weeks of partial disability 
       compensation, the employe may appeal the adjustment of benefit 
       status to a workers' compensation judge by filing a Petition for 
       Review. 
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that review of plaintiffs' claim was premature because, as a 
result of various contingencies, the court could not be 
certain that the statute would necessarily operate against 
any of the unions' members.6 
 
We are inclined to disagree with the district court that 
there is uncertainty regarding whether the statute will ever 
operate against any of the plaintiffs' members; rather, we 
find persuasive plaintiffs' argument that such an 
eventuality is almost certain. There is, however, a great deal 
of uncertainty regarding how the statute will operate 
against plaintiffs' members. It is this uncertainty that 
renders the claim unfit for judicial review. Plaintiffs ask the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
34 Pa. Code S 123.105(f). Under the WCA, an employee filing a petition 
for review is entitled to a prompt hearing. See 77 P.S. S 710 (West 1992). 
The workers' compensation judge assigned to the case is charged with 
holding a full evidentiary hearing, making findings of fact, conclusions 
of 
law, and ultimately determining whether a change in disability status 
was in accordance with the terms of section 306(a.2). See 77 P.S. S 833, 
834 (West 1992 & West Supp. 1997). Further, any party aggrieved by a 
workers' compensation judge's ruling has a right to appeal to the 
Workers' Compensation Appeal Board. See 77 P.S. S 853. A party 
aggrieved by the Appeal Board's decision has a right to appeal to the 
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, see 42 P.S. S 763, and a party 
aggrieved by that decision has the right to seek permission to appeal to 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, see 42 P.S. S 724. 
 
6. The contingencies relied upon by the district were that, in order for 
plaintiffs' members to be subject to the provisions of Section 306(a.2): 
(1) 
one of the members must suffer a compensable work-related injury after 
the effective date of Act 57, (2) the same member must be classified as 
totally disabled, (3) such total disability must continue for a period of 
104 weeks and not be changed because of the insurer's successful 
demonstration of earning power, (4) after the member's receipt of 104 
weeks of total disability benefits, the insurer must request that the 
member submit to an impairment rating evaluation, (5) the evaluation 
must result in an impairment rating of less than 50% under the 
American Medical Association's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent 
Impairment, (6) the insurer must adjust the disability status of the 
member from total to partial, and (7) the member must, over a period of 
500 weeks, be unable to demonstrate that the impairment is greater 
than 50%. See Philadelphia Fed. of Teachers v. Ridge, 1997 WL 364397, 
at * 7 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 1997). 
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court to declare constitutionally deficient procedures that 
have yet to be applied. Such a judgment would be 
premature. Rather, we believe that review of plaintiffs' 
procedural due process claim must be done in the context 
of a specific factual setting. 
 
Our conclusion is buttressed by Judge Calabresi's recent 
decision in Thomas v. City of New York, ___ F.3d ___, 1998 
WL 210679 (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 1998). There, the court 
considered, inter alia, a due process challenge to the 
procedures set forth in a new local law governing the 
licensing procedures for livery cab base stations. The court 
concluded that this claim was not ripe for judicial review 
since 
 
       None of the plaintiffs has, to date, been denied a 
       license. And, while on the face of [the new law] and its 
       regulations, no proceedings -- either written findings 
       or oral hearings -- are mandated prior to the denial of 
       licenses or of license renewals, we do not know at this 
       time what procedures [the agency] will in fact follow 
       before denying licenses. It follows that a claim that a 
       base station operator has been denied a license 
       renewal without procedural due process is best 
       considered in the context of a specific factual setting. 
 
1998 WL 210679, at * 2; see also Texas v. United States, 
118 S. Ct. at 1260 ("Here, as is often true,`[d]etermination 
of the scope of . . . legislation in advance of its immediate 
adverse effect in the context of a concrete case involves too 
remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of 
the judicial function.' " (quoting Longshoremen v. Boyd, 347 
U.S. 222, 224 (1954)). 
 
We might still review plaintiffs' procedural due process 
claim despite our conclusion that it is best considered in 
the context of a specific factual setting if denial of pre- 
enforcement review would work a significant hardship to 
the plaintiffs.7 In this case, however, we discern no 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Whether ripeness requires that both parts of the test be satisfied is a 
matter of some uncertainty. See Ernst & Young v. Depositors Econ. 
Protection Corp., 45 F.3d 530, 535 (1st Cir. 1995) ("The relationship 
between [the] two parts of the test -- fitness and hardship -- has never 
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hardship that will result from withholding review of the 
constitutionality of WCA S 304(a.2) until a court is able to 
review the procedures actually employed by the 
Department. Even assuming that an employee is deprived 
of his or her due process rights in the future by those 
procedures, the change in disability status will not affect 
the level of benefits provided to the employee for five 
hundred weeks. See 77 P.S. S 512.2 (7). The employee will, 
therefore, have ample time to challenge the constitutionality 
of the procedures employed before being deprived of any 
benefits. 
 
B. The Pension Offset (Contract Clause Claims)  
 
Plaintiffs allege that section 204(a) of the WCA, on its 
face, violates the contract clauses of both the United States 
and Pennsylvania constitutions. This claim, which is 
predominately legal, is arguably fit for review. However, 
even "the presence of `a purely legal question' is not 
enough, of itself, to render a case ripe for judicial review, 
not even as to that issue." Armstrong, 961 F.2d at 421 
(quoting Office of Communications of the United Church of 
Christ v. FCC, 826 F.2d 101, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). Rather, 
the plaintiffs must still demonstrate that they face a real 
and immediate threat of injury from the denial of pre- 
enforcement review of the merits. See id. at 421-22. In the 
absence of such hardship, the better course is for a federal 
court to wait until the claim is raised in a specific factual 
setting since this will almost universally aid in review. As 
Judge Easterbrook recently opined in a not dissimilar 
situation: "if anticipatory review is not essential to avoid 
hardship, then courts should defer review, in order to 
obtain the benefits of the more focused presentation made 
possible by a concrete application of the rules." Illinois 
Council on Long Term Care, Inc. v. Shalala, ___ F.3d ___, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
been precisely defined."). The majority view is that both prongs of the 
test must ordinarily be satisfied in order to establish ripeness, with the 
caveat that there exists "the possibility that there may be some sort of 
sliding scale under which, say, a very powerful exhibition of immediate 
hardship might compensate for questionable fitness. . . or vice versa." 
See id. (collecting citations). We need not consider the issue here. 
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1998 WL 228063, * 6 (7th Cir. May 8, 1998) (citing Texas 
v. United States, supra.) 
 
In the instant case, even applying the usual standards 
for construing the allegations of a complaint which give the 
plaintiff the benefit of all favorable inferences, plaintiffs 
have failed to meet their burden of alleging facts sufficient 
to demonstrate a threat of direct and immediate hardship 
stemming from the lack of pre-enforcement review. Rather, 
plaintiffs simply aver, in conclusory terms, that "[a]s a 
result of the passage of Section 3 of Act 57, the Plaintiffs' 
members are suffering immediate and/or threatened injury 
. . . ." (Compl. PP 46, 54). Plaintiffs do not, however, allege 
any facts that support this legal conclusion by 
demonstrating the actual and immediate harm they or their 
members suffer from Section 204(a) of the WCA. 
 
Plaintiffs, in their briefing, do assert a direct and 
immediate harm to their members. There, plaintiffs contend 
that section 204(a) creates an uncertainty regarding their 
members' future income streams since their members 
cannot be sure that they will receive full pension benefits 
and full workers' compensation benefits if they have the 
misfortune of being injured on the job. The argument that 
this uncertainty constitutes a cognizable harm for purposes 
of ripeness analysis is based on the Court of Appeals' 
decision in Riva v. Massachusetts, 61 F.3d 1003 (1st Cir. 
1995). Riva involved a claim that the Massachusetts 
accidental disability retirement scheme violated the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act. The challenged portion 
of the statute provided that disability benefits would be 
reduced at age sixty-five for retired public employees with 
less than ten years creditable service who were overfifty- 
five at the time of their accidental disability retirement. The 
court found that the statute was ripe for review even 
though it would not directly affect the plaintiff for several 
years. The plaintiff, Robert Keenan, had already been 
declared permanently disabled at the age of fifty-six and 
had received notice that his benefits would be reduced 
when he turned age sixty-five by operation of the 
challenged statute. In applying the Abbott Labs framework, 
the court found that the hardship prong was satisfied 
because the uncertainty about the validity of the statute 
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made it impossible for Keenan, then age fifty-eight, 
"prudently to arrange his fiscal affairs" in anticipation of his 
retirement years. 61 F.3d at 1012. 
 
We believe that Riva is distinguishable from the instant 
case. The Riva court had before it a plaintiff who had 
already been declared permanently disabled and who would 
be adversely affected by the statute at the time when he 
turned sixty-five unless the statute was repealed or 
amended, or unless he died. 61 F.3d at 1010-11. Here, we 
have no such plaintiff, and thus no one has suffered as 
"direct and immediate" an injury as Keenan. Moreover, Riva 
involved much less hardship then was present in Abbott 
Labs, where the regulation at issue had a "direct effect on 
the day-to-day business" of the plaintiffs, who were 
compelled to affix required labeling to their products under 
threat of criminal sanction. See 387 U.S. at 153. We are not 
convinced, therefore, that the finding of hardship in Riva is 
supportable. However, even if it is, the hardship asserted in 
this case is one step removed even from Riva, and that step 
is one that we decline to take. 
 
Thus, we conclude that review of the constitutionality of 
Section 204(a) by a federal court, like review of Section 
306(a.2), should be reserved until such time as the court is 
presented with a concrete factual situation. We note, also, 
that that day is likely not too far off. As of June 24, 1998, 
it has been 104 weeks since the effective date of Act 57 and 
thus presumably some employee has appealed (or soon will 
appeal) a change in his or her disability status, thus 
triggering the review process set forth in 77 P.S.S 511.2 
and the applicable regulations. We also assume that the 
pension offset provision has been, or soon will be, utilized. 
 
The order of the district court, dismissing without 
prejudice plaintiffs' complaint on the ground that it did not 
present a controversy ripe for resolution, will be affirmed. 
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